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Writer's pictureMarvin Lee

Series: Russo-Japanese War - A Glimpse of Hope

Updated: Dec 26, 2022

As the Japanese government anticipated war with the Russian Empire, they made every effort to obtain adequate military funding. Despite the fact that the entire country supported the principle of 'enrich the country, strengthen the Armed Forces,' citizens' financial burden had reached its limit or a further socio-economic burden might trigger public anger. Because of this imminent concern, the Imperial Conference debated whether Japan’s financial strength would be sufficient to support a long-term war. Unsurprisingly, the Japanese Empire was incapable of supporting a large-scale war. Japan’s public finance revenue and active military personnel were only a tenth of those of the Russian Empire. Hence, the former Japanese General Viscount Kodama Gentaro believed that a military conflict with Russia was a suicide mission.

The former Japanese General Viscount Kodama Gentaro
The former Japanese General Viscount Kodama Gentaro

Although it was a tall order to challenge the Russian Empire, the Japanese government decided to send Takahashi Korekiyo, the deputy governor of the Bank of Japan, to sell national loans to Western countries. However, no foreign power was willing to offer Japan wartime capital because the upcoming war was a one-sided contest between the Russian Empire and the Japanese Empire. Furthermore, as 'White Supremacy' demonstrated the disparity between white and non-white countries, the European empire has yet to be defeated in a large-scale war by a non-Western empire. When Mr Takahashi Korekiyo became disheartened and discouraged, he consulted with Jacob Schiff, a German-born Jewish American banker, in Paris in April 1904. As a solemn response to the Russian Empire's anti-Semitic actions, particularly the Kishinev pogrom a year ago, Jacob Schiff agreed to make loans to the Japanese Empire totalling $180 million.

Jacob Schiff
Jacob Schiff

Meanwhile, the British Empire generously extended loans totalling 36 million British pounds to the Japanese Empire. Despite receiving massive wartime loans to prepare for a large-scale war, Japan's arms industry could not support this impending military conflict solely. The Imperial Japanese Navy found that purchasing battleships from the British Empire was the most effective solution. Six battleships, four armoured cruisers, two cruisers, sixteen destroyers, and ten torpedo boats were manufactured by the British. In addition, the Japanese admirals learned every military strategy from the Royal Navy. Given this, the British aided the Japanese in significantly increasing their military might. Furthermore, British diplomats did everything they could to discourage the Russians from purchasing battleships from other countries. The Royal Navy also raised the possibility of a clash with the Baltic Fleet if they joined the war in the Far East. As a result, the Japanese had plenty of time to prepare for war when the British provided diplomatic and military support. After obtaining more military, wartime loans, and diplomatic support, Japanese admirals and generals felt more confident. It is time to fight the Russian Empire!



 

References

  • Best, G. D. (1972). Financing a Foreign War: Jacob H. Schiff and Japan, 1904–05. American Jewish Historical Quarterly, 61(4), 313–324.

  • British Assistance to the Japanese Navy during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. (1980). The Great Circle, 2(1), 44–54.

  • D Steinberg J W Wolff (Eds. (2007). Russo-Japanese War in global perspective ; World War Zero. Vol. 2. (pp. 87–178). Brill.

  • Esthus, R. A. (1981). Nicholas II and the Russo-Japanese War. Russian Review, 40(4), 396. https://doi.org/10.2307/129919

  • McKercher, B. J. C. (1989). Diplomatic Equipoise: The Lansdowne Foreign Office the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and the Global Balance of Power. Canadian Journal of History, 24(3), 299–340. https://doi.org/10.3138/cjh.24.3.299

  • Wurtzburg, S. J. (2006). Choctaw Women in a Chaotic World: The Clash of Cultures in the Colonial Southeast. Ethnohistory, 53(4), 774–776. https://doi.org/10.1215/00141801-2006-027

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